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REPLACING TINKER
Noah C. Chauvin *
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Mahanoy Area School District
v. B.L. ex rel. Levy1 is a victory for the free speech rights of schoolchildren. Mahanoy involved Brandi Levy, a then-high school student who was disciplined by her cheerleading coach for posting a
vulgar message on social media disparaging the school and two of
its athletic teams.2 She challenged the coach’s actions in federal
court, arguing that the school did not have the authority to discipline her for her speech, which took place off campus and outside
of school hours.3
She won at every level. The district court granted her a preliminary injunction and then summary judgment.4 The Third Circuit
agreed that the school district had violated her First Amendment
rights, finding that the school erred in punishing Ms. Levy for her
speech, which was protected by the First Amendment.5 Significantly, the Third Circuit concluded that Ms. Levy’s speech occurred
“off campus” and that the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District standard—which allows schools to punish
student speech that school officials reasonably believe will substantially disrupt school operations or impinge upon the rights of

* Attorney Advisor, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. I am grateful to the editors of the University of Richmond Law Review, whose careful work greatly improved this
Article. All views—and all errors—are strictly my own.
1. 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
2. Id. at 2043. Although Ms. Levy repeatedly used a word in her social media message
that in some contexts refers to copulation, there is little dispute that her meaning was
merely vulgar, not obscene. See id. at 2046; B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist.,
964 F.3d 170, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2020).
3. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043.
4. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d 607, 616 (M.D. Pa.
2017) (granting B.L. a preliminary injunction); B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist.,
376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 445 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (granting B.L. summary judgment).
5. Mahanoy, 964 F.3d at 194.
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others—did not apply to off-campus speech.6 The school district
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which the Supreme Court of
the United States granted, agreeing to answer the question of
whether the Tinker standard applies to off-campus student
speech.7
The Supreme Court’s opinion, written by Justice Stephen
Breyer,8 is not quite the blockbuster that many anticipated it
would be.9 As is typical of Justice Breyer’s approach to judging, the
opinion is relatively narrow, focusing on the specifics of the case
without establishing any bright-line rules.10 While the majority
criticized the Third Circuit’s decision, explaining that it “d[id] not
believe the special characteristics that give schools additional license to regulate student speech always disappear when a school
regulates speech that takes place off campus,” it declined to “set
forth a broad, highly general First Amendment rule stating just
what counts as ‘off-campus’ speech and whether or how ordinary
First Amendment standards must give way off campus to a school’s
special need” to protect the learning environment and the members
of the school community.11
However, the opinion did identify “three features of off-campus
speech” that distinguish it from speech that takes place on-campus
6. Id. at 180–81, 189–91 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S
503, 505 (1969)).
7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (No. 20-255),
2020 U.S. S. CT. BRIEFS LEXIS 6442 at 4; Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043.
8. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2042.
9. See, e.g., Adam J. Tragone, UPDATE: Supreme Court to Hear Mahanoy Area School
District v. B.L. First Amendment Speech Protection Case, NAT’L L. REV. (May 10, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/update-supreme-court-to-hear-mahanoy-area-school
-district-v-bl-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/ZQ4W-HTKV] (“The Supreme Court of the
United States will hear argument in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. and whatever
the result, the decision will fundamentally change how a public school can discipline students for speech that occurs outside the school.”); see also Benjamin P. Schroff, Comment,
Not Another Teen Tweet: Social Media, Schools, and a Return to Tinker, 28 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 603, 627–28 (2020) (arguing that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari
in Mahanoy and create a bright-line rule preventing schools from regulating off-campus
speech).
10. See Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045 (“[W]e do not now set forth a broad, highly general
First Amendment rule . . . .”); see also Clay Calvert, Curing the First Amendment Scrutiny
Muddle Through a Breyer-Based Blend Up? Toward a Less Categorical, More Values-Oriented Approach for Selecting Standards of Judicial Review, 65 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 13–
14 (2021); Noah C. Chauvin, Unifying Establishment Clause Purpose, Standing, and Standards, 50 U. MEM. L. REV. 319, 357–59 (2019); Paul Gewirtz, The Pragmatic Passion of Stephen Breyer, 115 YALE L.J. 1675, 1677 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)). The relative narrowness of the
opinion may be why seven other Justices agreed to join it.
11. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045.
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and weaken a school’s need and ability to regulate it.12 Specifically,
the majority noted that: (1) schools rarely stand in loco parentis
when it comes to students’ off-campus speech; (2) school regulation
of off-campus speech could lead to outright bans on certain kinds
of student speech, which courts should be skeptical of—especially
if they are bans on political or religious speech; and (3) schools have
an interest in protecting even unpopular expression by their students, because schools, as “the nurseries of democracy,” should
model important civic values for their students.13
Based on these features and the circumstances of the case, the
Court concluded that the school district had acted impermissibly
in punishing Ms. Levy for her off-campus speech.14 The Court explained that while Ms. Levy’s post included vulgar language, given
that the post was made off campus and outside of school hours, it
was Ms. Levy’s parents—not her school—that were responsible for
determining what punishment (if any) was appropriate.15 Further,
there was no evidence that Ms. Levy’s off-campus speech caused a
substantial disruption to the functioning of the school, either by
disrupting the classroom or the cheerleading team’s activities, or
by negatively impacting cheerleaders’ team morale.16 Therefore,
the Court concluded that, though Ms. Levy’s social media post was
hardly the sort of soaring political rhetoric we often imagine to be
the core concern of the First Amendment, it still merited protection.17 Quoting an earlier opinion involving similar vulgarity, the
Court concluded: “We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what
otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege . . . fundamental societal values
are truly implicated.”18
Because the Mahanoy majority opinion eschewed bright-line
rules and gave little concrete guidance on the boundaries of appropriate speech regulation by schools, some see it as a rather tepid
victory for student speech rights.19 Still, the Court’s decision comes
12. Id. at 2046.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2048.
15. Id. at 2047.
16. Id. at 2047–48.
17. Id. at 2048.
18. Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)).
19. See Catherine J. Ross, One “Vulgar” Cheerleader Vindicated—But Other Students
May Still Face Discipline for Off-Campus Speech, FIRST AMEND. WATCH AT N.Y.U. (July 6,
2021), https://firstamendmentwatch.org/one-vulgar-cheerleader-vindicated-but-other-stude
nts-may-still-face-discipline-for-off-campus-speech [https://perma.cc/P3MR-5DCC].
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as something of a relief to student speech activists, who feared that
the Court may only have agreed to hear the case as a means of
further restricting student speech rights.20 Instead, they got an
opinion that “reaffirmed the animating spirit of Tinker”21—a sure
victory.
However, in this Article, I wish to question whether reaffirming
the animating spirit of Tinker is the best way to protect student
speech rights. In allowing schools to punish student speech that
school officials reasonably believe could be substantially disruptive, Tinker founds students’ free expression rights on unstable
ground. This is true for two reasons. First, the Tinker standard allows school officials to regulate student speech based on their own
perceptions of what its impacts will be.22 While these perceptions
must be reasonable, courts have shown extraordinary deference to
educators’ claims that student speech could be substantially disruptive. Second, the substantial disruption standard allows speech
to be restricted not because it is in some way unlawful, but rather
because of what others’ reactions might be to it.23 As I discuss below, government regulations with either one of these defects would
generally be found unconstitutional in a nonschool context, because they give government officials too much discretion to burden
or proscribe unpopular speech—the very harm the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee is designed to guard against.24
For these reasons, I argue that Tinker’s substantial disruption
standard ought to be replaced by something like the public forum
doctrine, which tailors governments’ power to restrict speech in a
given forum based on the forum’s traditional use and the government’s role in creating it and is highly skeptical of government discretion in determining what expression will be allowed in the forum.25 In my view, schools should be allowed to regulate student
speech only when they create or control the forum in which it is

20. See Nico Perrino, So to Speak Podcast Transcript: Mahanoy v. B.L. Supreme Court
Ruling Analysis, FIRE (July 2, 2021), https://www.thefire.org/so-to-speak-podcast-trans
cript-mahanoy-v-b-l-supreme-court-ruling-analysis [https://perma.cc/NJ67-78R2].
21. Id.; see also David L. Hudson Jr., First Amendment News 302.2: Supreme Court
Breathes New Life Into Tinker and Rules in Favor of Student Speech, FIRE (June 29, 2021),
https://www.thefire.org/fan-302-2-supreme-court-breathes-new-life-into-tinker-and-rules-i
n-favor-of-student-speech [https://perma.cc/34KQ-9367]; Ross, supra note 19 (“Justice
Breyer’s eloquent dicta . . . reaffirmed the vision that had animated Tinker.”).
22. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23. Id.
24. See infra notes 123–31 and accompanying text.
25. E.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
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expressed. Otherwise, they should be without the power to regulate student speech. Even within the forums that they control, I
argue that schools’ ability to regulate student speech should be circumscribed.
I am neither a naïf nor a free speech absolutist26—I recognize
that there will be times when schools will have a legitimate need
to impose content- and viewpoint-based restrictions on student
speech that would be impermissible under the First Amendment
in other contexts. Still, as I outline below, replacing the Tinker
standard will limit school officials’ authority to restrict student
speech based on their own interpretations of it and will prevent
them from proscribing speech based on other students’ predicted
or actual reactions to it. Not only will this mean that student
speech is better protected than it currently is by Tinker’s substantial disruption standard, but it will bring the principles governing
student speech regulation more closely in line with the rules that
limit the government’s authority over speech in nonschool contexts—allowing America’s public schools to better serve their purpose as “nurseries of democracy.”27
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I discuss the ways
in which the Tinker standard is unusual: it allows effects-based
regulation of speech and vests government officials with substantial discretion to determine which speech should be proscribed. I
explain that these differences arise from conceptual flaws in the
Tinker standard, that these flaws have the practical consequence
of making the Tinker standard fundamentally unworkable, and
that they warrant replacing the Tinker standard.
In Part II, I pick up on this thread and suggest that the Tinker
standard be replaced with something approximating the public forum doctrine.28 Specifically, I say that schools should only be allowed to regulate student speech if they create or control the forum
in which that speech occurs. I argue that such a standard would
remove a great deal of subjectivity from school officials’ speech decisions, would be easier to apply, and would place a meaningful
and readily identifiable limit on schools’ authority to regulate “offcampus” speech.29
26. My writing, however, does sometimes tend towards redundancy.
27. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021).
28. As I explain in Part III, “something like” does a fair amount of work in my formulation.
29. It would also make it easier to identify what counts as “off-campus” speech, as
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Finally,30 in Part III, I consider two counterarguments: first,
that abandoning Tinker would leave schools powerless to address
harmful speech such as bullying, especially if it occurred off campus, and second, that doing away with Tinker would prevent
schools from enacting necessary speech controls while children are
on campus. Although both arguments have some merit, I ultimately reject them.
I. EFFECTS-BASED SPEECH REGULATIONS
As noted above, the Supreme Court held in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District that schools may restrict
speech if school officials reasonably anticipate that it will “substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the
rights of other students.”31 Additionally schools may proscribe student speech that could reasonably be perceived as coming from the
school;32 speech that is “lewd,” “indecent,” or “vulgar;”33 and speech
that celebrates, advocates for, or promotes illegal drug use.34
When it was first decided in 1969, Tinker was rightly lauded as
an “important” decision because it “impose[d] new limitation on the
power of the state to restrain students from speech or conduct
which would clearly be protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment if engaged in by adults.”35 Still, it is undeniable that in the pantheon of
free speech decisions, Tinker is odd. Outside of the schoolhouse
gate, two related principles animate the law concerning First
discussed more fully in Part II.
30. Not really “finally,” per se—there is a conclusion. But it’s a paragraph long and
doesn’t contribute anything substantive, so it doesn’t go in the roadmap.
31. 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
32. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (explaining that, when
it comes to “school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear
the imprimatur of the school[,] . . . [e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control over
[these forms] of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may
be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are
not erroneously attributed to the school”).
33. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684–85 (1986).
34. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 402–03 (2007).
35. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 62, 154, 157–58 (1969); see also
JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 84 (2018); Christopher J. Roederer, What Was Wrong
with Tinker: Mind the Gap, 45 U. DAYTON L. REV. 229, 255 (2020). Indeed, as Professor R.
George Wright has documented, “Tinker . . . remains popular, with or without some qualification, disclaimer, or particular interpretation, among contemporary free speech scholars.”
R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 3 (2014).
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Amendment free speech rights: the government may not restrict
speech based on its content, and government officials do not have
discretion to decide what speech is allowed. Of course, there are
limits on these principles. The State may still proscribe, for instance, incitements to violence,36 so-called fighting words,37 and
child pornography.38 In each of these categories, speech may be
limited based on its content and government officials will, by necessity, have some measure of discretion in determining which
speech may be proscribed. Still though, as a general matter, content-based restrictions and unrestrained government discretion
are not permissible forms of speech regulation under the First
Amendment.
It was not always so. Indeed, the story of free speech litigation
over the last century can be summed up as the expansion of protections for speech regardless of its content and the corresponding
cabining of government officials’ discretion to restrict speech for
subjective reasons.39 The First Amendment got off to an inauspicious start in the Supreme Court in the 1919 case of Schenck v.
United States.40 In that case, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
writing for a unanimous Court, held that words may be proscribed
if they “are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”41 On this
basis, the Court upheld the convictions of two pamphleteers who
had circulated a leaflet advocating for resisting the draft through
means such as petitioning the government.42 Because it was illegal
to interfere with the recruiting service, and because the Court
could “not see what effect [the leaflet] could be expected to have
upon persons subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out,” it found that the pamphleteers’ conviction did not violate the First Amendment.43

36. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909–10 (1982).
37. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
708 (1969).
38. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–99 (2008); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 757, 764–65 (1982).
39. See Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone, Dialogue, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY
1, 5–6 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2019).
40. 249 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1919).
41. Id. at 52.
42. Id. at 50–53.
43. Id. at 51–53.

1142

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1135

The result in Schenck seems shocking to our modern sensibilities: how could one ever lawfully advocate for political change if the
government has the power to outlaw such advocacy? It would be a
frightening world indeed if the government could, at its discretion,
imprison anyone who criticized it. Recognizing these issues with
the clear and present danger test, the Supreme Court subsequently
substantially narrowed it.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court considered Clarence Brandenburg’s First Amendment challenge to his conviction under a
state statute that proscribed “advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity,
or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform.”44 Mr. Brandenburg was a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group
who gave a speech in a field in the middle of the night to eleven
other Klan members and some members of the local media.45 As
part of that speech, he declared that the Klan was not “a revengent
organization,” but that if the federal government “continue[d] to
suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might
have to be some revengeance taken.”46 In reversing his conviction,
the Supreme Court explained that the First Amendment “do[es]
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.”47 This was a substantial restriction on the
governments’ powers to restrict even abhorrent speech that could
interfere with legitimate governmental goals.
The trend away from subjective governmental authority to limit
speech based on its content is perhaps best exemplified by the cases
concerning the so-called “heckler’s veto.” A heckler’s veto occurs
when a person or persons opposed to a speaker’s message acts in a
manner that is dangerous or disruptive, in the hope of silencing
the speaker.48 For a long time, such tactics were effective. For instance, in Feiner v. New York, the Supreme Court found that the
conviction of a civil rights agitator for incitement of a breach of the
peace based on a speech he had given urging African Americans to
44. 395 U.S. 444, 444–45 (1969) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (1969)).
45. Id. at 445–46.
46. Id. at 446.
47. Id. at 447.
48. See Noah C. Chauvin, Policing the Heckler’s Veto: Toward a Heightened Duty of
Speech Protection on College Campuses, 52 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 33 (2018).
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fight for their civil rights did not violate the First Amendment.49 In
upholding the man’s conviction, the Court explained that the man
was not arrested for his speech but for “the reaction which it actually engendered”—“some pushing, shoving and milling around” in
the crowd of people listening to the man, who disapproved of what
he was saying.50 Arresting the man, the Court said, was an appropriate response to the “crisis” his words precipitated.51
Such a principle is clearly untenable. If listeners could silence a
speaker merely by reacting poorly to his or her message, there
would be little purpose in having a First Amendment at all. After
all, the point of the First Amendment is to protect unpopular
speech, as popular speech rarely needs protection from governments based on the sovereign power of the majority.52 These concerns are only exacerbated when the government need not prove
any actual disturbance and instead may merely show that its
agents expected one.
The Supreme Court recognized its error relatively quickly;
twelve years after it decided Feiner it ruled in Edwards v. South
Carolina that Black civil rights protestors could not be prosecuted
for breach of the peace when there was no evidence that their
march had led to any actual breach.53 The Court subsequently expanded this principle, finding in Gregory v. Chicago that peaceful
political protestors could not be held criminally liable for the unruly actions of those responding to their protest.54 These principles
hold no matter how repugnant the speech at issue: courts have consistently prevented government officials from restricting or burdening even the speech of Nazis based on what the officials predict
will be the public’s reaction to that speech.55 As these heckler’s veto
cases demonstrate, the First Amendment generally will not tolerate expansive authority on the part of government agents to decide
what speech they will prohibit or burden based on its content.

49. 340 U.S. 315, 317–18, 321 (1951).
50. Id. at 317, 319–20.
51. Id. at 321.
52. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021); Noah
C. Chauvin, Essay, Governments “Erasing History” and the Importance of Free Speech, 41
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2020).
53. 372 U.S. 229, 229–30, 233–34 (1963).
54. 394 U.S. 111, 113 (1969).
55. E.g., Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992); Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206–07 (7th Cir. 1978); Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373
N.E.2d 21, 26 (Ill. 1978).
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Tinker stands apart from these modern heckler’s veto cases in
that courts considering student speech may “not distinguish between ‘substantial disruption’ caused by the speaker and ‘substantial disruption’ caused by the reactions of onlookers or a combination of circumstances.”56 In other words, whereas listener reaction
is generally an illegitimate reason for restricting speech, Tinker
allows school officials to punish speech for precisely this reason.57
Similarly, as long as school officials can provide some evidence supporting their assertion that speech will be disruptive, they may restrict it58—something not generally allowable under the First
Amendment. Tinker bucks the general trend not in that it originally allowed content-based and discretionary speech regulation,
or even in that it allowed the government to restrict speech based
on listeners’ reactions to it—such standards were common as the
First Amendment free speech standards were developed—but in
that, in the fifty-plus years since it was decided, the protections
Tinker affords have been narrowed, rather than expanded.59
That the Tinker standard is an oddity in the pantheon of First
Amendment free speech law, though, is not enough to justify doing
away with it. A great many legal standards and concepts apply differently to children because children are different than adults.60
The relevant question, therefore, is whether the Tinker standard
treats children differently from adults in an acceptable manner
and for acceptable reasons. In other words: does the Tinker substantial disruption standard treat schoolchildren’s speech differently than that of adults because of the differences between children and adults?
It does not. The Tinker substantial disruption standard is conceptually flawed because it allows school officials to censor student
speech almost with impunity. In theory, this should not be the case.
The Supreme Court has described Tinker’s substantial disruption

56. Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 778 (9th Cir. 2014).
57. See DRIVER, supra note 35, at 88–89.
58. See Wright, supra note 35, at 12–14.
59. E.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 402–03 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685
(1986).
60. This is particularly true in the context of public-school students, whom the courts
have found have significantly different rights than do adults. See, e.g., Veronia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656–57 (1995) (“Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for
children.”).
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standard as “demanding,” because it is not supposed to allow
school officials to censor student speech based only on the officials’
belief that given speech will cause a substantial disruption.61 Indeed, as the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “student expression
may not be suppressed simply because it gives rise to some slight,
easily overlooked disruption, including but not limited to ‘a showing of mild curiosity’ by other students, ‘discussion and comment’
among students, or even some ‘hostile remarks’ or ‘discussion outside of the classrooms’ by other students.”62
Yet, while courts have read these limitations onto the standard,
Tinker’s language itself—which allows school officials to censor
speech they reasonably believe will “substantially interfere with
the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students”63—contains no such limitation. It is an objective standard—
school officials may not limit speech based solely on how they feel
about it—but as long as they can point to some evidence tending to
show that speech is or will be disruptive, it is entirely within their
power to prohibit it. This is especially true because the core of “the
work of the school” is to educate students, and even minor distractions can substantially interfere with this vital role.64 Indeed, there
is no reason under the plain language of the standard that school
officials could not treat their own response to student speech as
itself a substantial disruption, and as is discussed below, some
school officials have done so. For these reasons, there is very little
reason to imagine that, under the Tinker standard, schools are restricted to punishing student speech that occurs on campus—in the
age of the internet and social media, even off-campus speech can
easily have disruptive on-campus effects.65

61. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2047–48 (2021); see
also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
62. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 2004)
(internal citations omitted); see also CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW
SCHOOLS AND COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 157 (2015).
63. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
64. Wright, supra note 35, at 13–14; see also C. Eric Wood, Note, Learning on Razor’s
Edge: Re-Examining the Constitutionality of School District Policies Restricting Educationally Disruptive Speech, 15 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 101, 136–38 (2009).
65. Amanda N. Harding, Note, Unfriending Tinker: The Third Circuit Holds Schools
Cannot Regulate Off-Campus Social Media Speech, 66 VILL. L. REV. 219, 238–39 (2021)
(“[T]o preserve the intent behind Tinker and ensure a safe, secure school environment, the
Tinker exception must apply to off-campus student social media speech.”).

1146

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1135

This conceptual flaw with the substantial disruption standard
has practical consequences. As Professor Catherine J. Ross has explained:
School officials must decide rapidly how to respond to political hyperbole, racially offensive speech, and speech supporting or condemning
homosexuality, among other hot-button topics. Material disruption includes many situations that fall far short of danger to life and limb,
and schools also sweep in many minor inconveniences that they regard as material interference with education. The courts have encouraged that tendency by failing to articulate the boundaries of material
disruption more precisely.66

It is not just that the Tinker standard allows school officials to
abuse their power to censor in theory: school officials, often with
the blessing of the courts, have been able to use the flexibility of
the substantial disruption standard to undermine student
speech—notwithstanding the basic principle that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome
the right to freedom of expression”67 and that minimal disturbances are not sufficient to “meet Tinker’s demanding standard.”68
Indeed, schools seeking to censor student speech under Tinker do
so primarily through the substantial disruption prong of the test,
not the impingement on the rights of others prong,69 perhaps because the first prong is much easier to satisfy.
Thus, for instance, in Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard,
then-third grader Amanda Walker-Serrano was found to have
caused a substantial disruption for protesting her class’s trip to the
circus.70 Specifically, Ms. Walker-Serrano circulated a petition
among her classmates which said that “we 3rd grade kids don’t
want to go to the circus because they hurt animals. We want a better feild [sic] trip.”71 Ms. Walker-Serrano circulated the petition
among her classmates, and managed to get several dozen signatures on it.72 The “substantial disruption” occurred when, during a
period when they should have been reading at their desks, several
students gathered around Ms. Walker-Serrano’s desk to discuss
the petition.73 Based on this, the Middle District of Pennsylvania
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

ROSS, supra note 62, at 150.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2047–48 (2021).
See ROSS, supra note 62, at 150.
168 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
Id. at 335.
Id.
Id. at 344. Ms. Walker-Serrano disputed this version of events, saying that a single
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found that school officials were reasonable in silencing Ms. WalkerSerrano, because there had been “an actual classroom disruption”
and it was reasonable to “believe that the situation could escalate
further.”74
Similarly, in C1.G. ex rel. C.G. v. Siegfried, the District of Colorado held that a student who, while off campus, outside of school
hours, and from his personal device, posted an antisemitic message
on social media was properly suspended under Tinker.75 Specifically, the student posted a picture of three of his friends, wearing
clothing they had found in a thrift store, with the caption “Me and
the boys bout to exterminate the Jews.”76 Predictably, the message
was seen by several of the student’s schoolmates, some of whom
were understandably upset and showed it to their parents.77 The
parents, too, were understandably upset, and contacted the police,
school officials, and members of the Jewish community.78 Ultimately, four parents contacted the school expressing their concerns, several local news stories were run about the social media
post, and the school devoted a thirty-minute advisory period to discussing the incident.79 At the same time, the student was suspended pending the school’s “investigati[on] to determine the impact [of the student’s post] on the school environment”; eventually,
the student was suspended for one year.80 After the student ultimately sued, the District of Colorado held that he had failed to
state a First Amendment claim upon which relief could be granted,
as his actions led to a substantial disruption or, alternatively, foreseeably could have led to a substantial disruption.81
Likewise, the District of Arizona held in Ryan v. Mesa Unified
School District that a high school softball coach was entitled to
qualified immunity on a student-athlete’s claim that the coach had
violated the First Amendment when he dismissed her from the
team in part for posting “‘ITS WAR BITCHES’ [sic]” to one of her
social media accounts.82 The parties disputed who the post was
student came to her desk to ask for her phone number; they did not discuss the petition. Id.
at 336.
74. Id. at 344.
75. 477 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1208–10 (D. Colo. 2020).
76. Id. at 1200.
77. Id. at 1201.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1201–02.
80. Id. at 1201–03.
81. Id. at 1209–10.
82. 195 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1085, 1095 (D. Ariz. 2016).
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directed at.83 Tensions were high on the team before the social media post; many members of the team and its coaching staff were
deeply religious, which caused tensions with other team members,
including the Ryan plaintiffs.84 For instance, the plaintiffs contended that the coach encouraged pregame group prayers, which
made some members of the team uncomfortable.85 Unsurprisingly,
the teenagers on the team were unable to navigate their differences gracefully; some team members appeared to revel in making
their religious or more sheltered teammates uncomfortable by
playing sexually explicit music, and less-religious team members
were sometimes excluded from group activities.86
It was in this context that the District of Arizona found—without
analysis—that it was objectively reasonable for the coach to conclude that the student-athlete’s social media post would cause a
substantial disruption on the team.87 There was no evidence that
the team was less effective because of the post, that team members
were actively fighting because of it, or that more than a single
player felt that there was actually a schism on the team. The court
never explained why teenagers not getting along—hardly a shock
to anyone who has ever known or interacted with teenagers—is
itself a substantial disruption absent this kind of evidence.
These are cases involving student expression that was good, bad,
and ugly. Each case involved an alleged “substantial disruption” of
school activity. Each of these disruptions is comparable to the discussions that took up “5 to 10 minutes of an Algebra class ‘for just
a couple days’” and the “upset” prompted by B.L.’s messages, disruptions the Mahanoy Court held “d[id] not meet Tinker’s demanding standard.”88 And yet, in Walker-Serrano, Siegfried, and Ryan,
experienced school administrators and judges disagreed.
It is possible to view these cases as aberrations, as failings not
of the substantial disruption standard itself but of its application
in particular instances. This is wrong. In fact, the Tinker standard’s conceptual flaws naturally lend it to such abuse. The school
officials in Walker-Serrano could call a few students standing at

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1085.
Id. at 1083–84.
Id.
See id. at 1084–86.
Id. at 1095.
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2047–48 (2021).
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another student’s desk a substantial disruption,89 just as the school
officials in Siegfried could say the same of their own response to a
student’s speech,90 and the coaches in Ryan could pretend that
teenagers not getting along was a substantial disruption of school
activities91 because the Tinker substantial disruption standard
gives school officials nearly unfettered discretion to decide what
speech is allowable and what speech is not. After more than fifty
years during which the substantial discretion standard has
failed—both in theory and in practice—to rein in the censorious
excesses of school officials, it is time to replace it.
II. A REPLACEMENT STANDARD
Tinker is odd when considered in the context of the law governing nonschool speech. It may even be odd enough that we wish to
replace it with something. As with all constitutional standards of
long enough standing, however, the question is: replace it with
what?92 For the sake of predictability and the benefit of students,
administrators, attorneys, and judges, one tempting solution is to
impose a bright-line rule that is easy to apply.93 Two possible
bright-line rules seem possible. The first would be Justice Clarence
Thomas’s approach, which would find that as a matter of history,
students have little to no free speech rights as against their public
schools.94 The second would be the opposite approach, finding that
public school students have free speech rights that are indistinguishable from those of adult members of the community in a public park, even when the students are on campus.95 Neither approach is particularly compelling; the Constitution is not so

89. 168 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
90. 477 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1209–10 (D. Colo. 2020).
91. 195 F. Supp. 3d at 1095.
92. See, e.g., Fulton v. Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1882–83 (2021) (Barrett, J., concurring) (discussing whether a longstanding free exercise standard should be replaced); see
also Wright, supra note 35, at 24–25.
93. Of course, then legal scholars would suffer, as they would have less to write about.
But this is likely of concern only to legal scholars, who could frankly stand to do a little less
writing.
94. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2059, 2061
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410, 419–20 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
95. Even the most ardent supporters of students’ free speech rights do not tend to go
this far. See, e.g., Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045; Schroff, supra note 9, at 627–28.
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wooden as to require either the total elimination or the total deification of students’ free speech rights.96
It is clear that what is needed is not a bright-line rule, but a
standard that respects the free speech rights of students and their
educators’ need to enforce order in school. Here, too, there are options. On the one hand, courts might impose a standard that
weighs the schools’ interests in regulating speech heavily, reasoning that school officials are in the best position to determine what
level of speech regulation is necessary to ensure that schools are
able to fulfill their educational mandates.97 Conversely, courts
might choose a standard that preferences student speech rights,
reasoning that schools can only fulfill their duty of educating informed citizens in an environment which closely reflects that
which students will encounter outside of the schoolhouse gate.98 It
is towards this end of the spectrum that I believe student speech
standards should fall.
To implement more adult-like speech protections for student
speech, I propose that Tinker’s substantial disruption standard be
replaced with something approximating the public forum doctrine.
Under the public forum doctrine, governments may regulate
speech that takes place on their property in proportion to the use
to which the property has traditionally been put and the uses for
which it is designated.99 The public forum doctrine refers to places
such as parks and public sidewalks that have been traditionally
“devoted to assembly and debate” as traditional public forums.100
Speech in these places is entitled to a high level of protection: the
government may not ban all expressive activity in them, but may
instead implement time, place, and manner restrictions.101 Any
content-based restrictions must be narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.102 Similar principles apply to so-called
limited public forums—spaces not traditionally open to speech that
96. Indeed, as the Constitution is printed on parchment made from animal skins, rather
than paper made from wood pulp, it is not “wooden” at all. Differences Between Parchment,
Vellum and Paper, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/preservation/formats/papervellum.html [https://perma.cc/3GU7-UZXN] (Aug. 15, 2016).
97. See, e.g., Reesa Miles, Note, Defamation Is More than Just a Tort: A New Constitutional Standard for Internet Student Speech, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 357, 384–89.
98. See ROSS, supra note 62, at 288–92; Christopher Cavaliere, Note, Category Shopping: Cracking the Student Speech Categories, 40 STETSON L. REV. 877, 912 (2011).
99. E.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
100. Id. at 45.
101. Id.
102. Id. In other words, content-based restrictions on speech in public forums must satisfy so-called strict scrutiny.
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the government has opened to expressive activity.103 Here too, governments are limited to content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech, but they may elect to close the forum at any
time.104 Finally, there are nonpublic forums: public property that
is neither traditionally open for expression nor designated for that
purpose by the government.105 In these, the government is not limited to time, place, and manner restrictions and may regulate
speech based on its content, but may not restrict speech based on
its viewpoint.106
Courts have considered applying the public forum doctrine to
schoolchildren’s speech in certain contexts. However, they generally reject the idea that schools serve as either traditional or limited public forums.107 Schools need to be able to restrict “speech
that is inconsistent with [their] pedagogical mission,”108 and requiring them to implement only content- or viewpoint-neutral
speech regulations could interfere with this legitimate need. Thus,
schools generally only qualify as limited public forums in contexts
in which they allow any expression, such as in the booking of school
facilities by student or community groups or during school talent
shows.109
I do not wish to import the public forum doctrine into the school
context wholesale. As I discuss below in Part III, I do not believe
that such an importation would work. Among other things, even in
nonpublic forums, governments may not enact viewpoint-based restrictions on speech, but such restrictions are sometimes necessary
in schools. Rather, I wish to bring certain features of the public
forum doctrine to bear on the school context.

103. Id. at 45–46.
104. Id. at 46.
105. Id.
106. Id. Content-based restrictions foreclose entire topics of discussion, whereas viewpoint-based restrictions proscribe certain viewpoints. So, a government that passes a law
saying that no one can discuss baseball on government property has enacted a content-based
restriction, whereas a government that passes a law saying that no one can root for the
Washington Nationals on government property has enacted a(n egregious) viewpoint-based
restriction. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 11–12 (1993).
107. E.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988); Henerey ex rel.
Henerey v. St. Charles Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128, 1132–33 (8th Cir. 1999); Brody ex rel.
Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1118–20 (3d Cir. 1992); Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker
v. Leonard, 168 F. Supp. 2d 332, 345 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
108. Henerey, 200 F.3d at 1132.
109. See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267; O.T. ex rel. Turton v. Frenchtown Elementary
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 F. Supp. 2d 369, 377 (D.N.J. 2006).
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The first such feature is the public forum doctrine’s geographybased focus. The public forum doctrine tailors the appropriate level
of speech regulation to the use a particular piece of property is either traditionally put to or otherwise designated for.110 Similar
principles ought to apply to schools. Schools should only be allowed
to regulate student speech to the extent that they create or control
the forum in which it takes place. As I explain further below, I do
not mean for this to be a strictly geography-bound test. Indeed,
while the public forum doctrine traditionally focused on government regulations of speech on government property,111 it has subsequently been expanded to include spaces the government opens
for expression in cyberspace.112 Thus, for instance, government officials may not restrict the interactive spaces of their social media
accounts based on the viewpoints expressed by the people posting
there.113
Under traditional public forum doctrine, then (and here I refer
to the traditional doctrine of public forums, not the doctrine of traditional public forums), the government’s power to restrict speech
is analyzed with respect to their ownership or dominion over the
forum. Similar principles should apply to schools. In school buildings, on school trips or on the school bus, or even on school-issued
technology such as tablets or laptops,114 schools should have the
power to regulate student speech. However, what children say to
one another outside of school or on their personal devices (particularly when used off campus) should fall outside of the school’s dominion.115

110. E.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
111. E.g., id. at 45.
112. E.g., Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d
Cir. 2019). See generally Patricia Beety & Joline Zepcevski, Technological Transformation
of the Public Square: Government Officials Use of Social Media and the First Amendment,
47 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 510 (2021).
113. Knight First Amend. Inst., 928 F.3d at 238.
114. This is not to say that schools should necessarily be monitoring everything that
students are doing on school-issued technology. If schools are going to trust their students
with such technology, then they should trust them (within reason) to use it appropriately.
But to the extent that schools become aware of inappropriate speech on school technology,
it should be within their power to restrict or punish it. Likewise, restrictions on the use of
school technology, such as by blocking certain websites or setting terms of use are not constitutionally impermissible “prior restraints”; governments have the right to determine by
what terms their technology is used.
115. This is particularly the case because school authority in these cases would substantially infringe on parental rights. See, e.g., Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141
S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021); see also id. at 2048, 2053 (Alito, J., concurring).
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The second feature I wish to import from the realm of public forum analysis is a general skepticism of governmental discretion in
determining what speech to allow. Within the public forum doctrine, this skepticism is expressed in the near prohibition on content-based restrictions on expression in traditional and limited
public forums, and in the fact that viewpoint-based restrictions are
presumptively not allowed in any type of forum.116 As I will discuss
below in Part III at length, skepticism of government discretion
cannot manifest in the same way in schools, because schools have
a legitimate interest in enacting some content- and viewpointbased restrictions on speech. However, as discussed above in Part
I, one of the problems with the Tinker substantial disruption
standard is that it gives school officials too much discretion to decide what speech qualifies as a substantial disruption—even, in
some cases, allowing them to classify their own response to speech
as a reasonably foreseeable disruption that justifies censorship.117
Any replacement for the Tinker standard should be much more
skeptical of such discretion.
In the public forum context, the level of skepticism is related to
the use to which the forum is put. In traditional public forums,
government discretion is highly constrained, governments have
much greater power to regulate nonpublic forums, and limited public forums fall somewhere in the middle.118 In the school context,
as well, similar principles should apply. In classrooms, schools’ authority to regulate student speech is at its zenith; as will be explained in more detail in Part III, both content- and viewpointbased restrictions must be tolerated to some degree in classroom
settings, where the quality of students’ education depends in large
part on teachers being able to keep students on-task and learning
the material properly. In other settings, such as the lunchroom,
schools’ discretion is much lower. There, too, some content- and
viewpoint-based restrictions may be tolerable—we do not want
young children discussing sex or students of any age cursing—but
any such restrictions should be looked upon with a particularly
jaundiced eye.
Importing these two features of the public forum doctrine into
the First Amendment law governing school speech regulation

116. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985); Perry
Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
117. E.g., C1.G. ex rel. C.G. v. Siegfried, 477 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1209–10 (D. Colo. 2020).
118. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46–47.
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would help correct some of the issues with Tinker’s substantial disruption standard by making it more difficult for school officials to
arbitrarily decide which student speech is tolerable based on its
content. Indeed, it would have several benefits.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of moving away from the substantial disruption standard and to something akin to a public forum
analysis for student speech is that such a shift would make it easier to define the bounds of a school’s authority to regulate student
speech. There is no question that there are bounds on a school’s
authority—Tinker allows greater restrictions on students’ First
Amendment rights than would generally be acceptable119—but
where those bounds fall remains unclear.120 This makes it difficult
for school officials, students, parents, and attorneys to predict how
courts will treat restrictions on student speech that arguably occurs off campus.
The lack of clarity arises partly from the fact that what we think
of as “school” is not limited to what happens on the campus
grounds.121 A great many activities that are clearly a part of
school—athletics practices and games, band performances, and
class trips, to name just a few—take place off campus, so a standard that finds that schools only have the power to regulate student
speech on campus would prevent schools from exercising their authority in situations in which they have a clear interest in doing
so. Another portion of the confusion arises from changing technology. At the time Tinker was issued, it made sense to focus a school’s
power to regulate on speech that took place inside the schoolhouse
gate, as what a student said in, for example, the privacy of her own
home would rarely impact the orderly operation of the school. Now,
with the advent of social media, school-issued tablets and laptops,
and remote learning, this is no longer the case. Finally, as
119. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”); see also Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L.
ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2048 & n.1 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that Tinker
deals only with on-campus student speech); Erzonznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212
(1975) (“[M]inors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection.”);
DRIVER, supra note 35, at 8.
120. E.g., Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045 (“[W]e do not believe the special characteristics
that give schools additional license to regulate student speech always disappear when a
school regulates speech that takes place off campus.”); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401
(2007) (“There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries at to when courts should apply
school speech precedents.”); Ross, supra note 19.
121. E.g., B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 178–79 (3d Cir.
2020).
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discussed above in Part I, the unclear boundaries come partially
from conceptual problems with the Tinker standard: since Tinker
allows regulation of speech that school authorities reasonably anticipate will “substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge on the rights of other students,”122 schools seemingly have
the power to punish any speech they believe will be disruptive or
harmful, no matter where it takes place.123
The standard that I propose would largely eliminate these problems. It would provide that a school’s power to regulate student
expression stops the moment the student expresses himself or herself in a forum not of the school’s making. Thus, the things that
students say using school laptops at home or on the bus on the way
to an athletic competition, even though occurring “off campus,”
would fall within the scope of permissible school regulation. On the
other hand, things said during a sandlot baseball game taking
place on a school field on the weekend, even though technically “on
campus,” would fall outside of the school’s domain, as would the
social media posts a high school cheerleader makes at the Cocoa
Hut on a Saturday morning.124 Focusing on the school’s creation or
control of the forum—rather than the degree to which the speech
does or does not interfere with school operations—would help make
difficult questions about the bounds of a school’s authority to regulate speech much more straightforward to answer.
Another benefit is pedagogical: moving away from the Tinker
substantial disruption standard to something approximating the
public forum analysis for student speech means that students will
be educated in a speech environment that much more closely approximates the one they will encounter outside of school. In his
Mahanoy opinion, Justice Breyer observed that, as “the nurseries
of democracy,” public schools have “an interest in protecting a student’s unpopular expression,” to help train students in “the workings in practice” of a well-functioning republic.125 Replacing the
122. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
123. See id. at 513 (“[C]onduct by [a] student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is . . . not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”); Harding, supra note 65, at 238–39 (“[T]o
preserve the intent behind Tinker and ensure a safe, secure school environment, the Tinker
exception must apply to off-campus student social media speech.”).
124. See Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043.
125. Id. at 2046; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)
(“The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books,
the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a
civilized social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—
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Tinker standard will help schools achieve this aim. Under current
school speech doctrine, school officials may limit student speech if
the officials reasonably believe that other people will have a forceful negative reaction to it.126 But, as discussed above in Part I, this
is not how speech regulation works outside of the schoolhouse gate.
Ordinarily, government officials may not restrict otherwise-lawful
speech merely because it is controversial or because listeners may
or do have a negative reaction to it.127 And, a government decision
to restrict speech based on an official’s content- or viewpoint-based
assessment of what the likely audience reaction will be to that
speech—as school officials must do when determining whether
speech will substantially disrupt school operations—is highly suspect in nonschool contexts.128
Therefore, replacing the substantial disruption standard with
something similar to the public forum doctrine would help serve
the important educational interests identified in the Mahanoy majority opinion by bringing student speech standards more closely
in line with the standards that generally apply to non-school-related speech. Students would receive an education in the speech
principles that will govern their and others’ speech for the rest of
their lives.129 They might be forced to confront speech that makes
them profoundly uncomfortable, that challenges fundamental aspects of their beliefs or identities, or that they find deeply insulting.130 But they will encounter this kind of speech outside of school
as well, and it will do them good to experience it first, to learn how
to disagree amicably, and to find a way to live alongside even those
with whom they vehemently disagree,131 in a safe and supportive
school environment.132
demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct
and deportment in and out of class.”).
126. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
127. See Chauvin, supra note 48, at 44–47 (“[O]ver time, the Court’s jurisprudence in
this area has increasingly trended towards familiar territory: even in the face of widespread
discomfort, disgust, and outrage at a speaker’s message, the government has a duty to protect citizens’ free speech rights, and must remain content-neutral when regulating speech.”).
128. E.g., Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133–35 (1992).
129. See ROSS, supra note 62, at 288–92.
130. See, e.g., supra notes 70–87 and accompanying text.
131. These are skills students will require when they encounter such speech in the outside world.
132. In fact, some might argue that students will best learn to cope with the fact that
others disagree with them if the school environment is not particularly “safe,” at least where
safety means protection from ideas that offend. See GREG LUKIANOFF & JONATHAN HAIDT,
THE CODDLING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW GOOD INTENTIONS AND BAD IDEAS ARE
SETTING UP A GENERATION FOR FAILURE 204–06 (2018).
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In many respects then, replacing the Tinker substantial disruption standard with something approximating the public forum doctrine would be highly beneficial. Such a standard would constrain
the arbitrary exercise of government censorship power and provide
a clearer indication of in what circumstances schools could regulate
their students’ speech. It would therefore make it easier for students, their parents, school officials, lawyers, and judges to determine what speech regulations are appropriate, and what ones are
constitutionally suspect. And, it would serve important pedagogical interests by training students on how to responsibly exercise
one of our most crucial civil liberties. So far, so good. But, as with
any standard, there must be drawbacks. What are they, and how
do we deal with them?
III. CONCERNS AND LIMITATIONS
Even if there are good reasons for replacing the Tinker standard,
and even if something like the limited public forum test is a viable
alternative, there are potential issues that must be resolved. In
this Part, I address two of them: first, the argument that eliminating the substantial disruption standard would leave schools powerless to address off-campus speech, such as bullying, that causes
meaningful problems on campus, and second, the related argument
that a standard like the limited public forum test would severely
limit schools’ ability to legitimately restrict on-campus student
speech, such as vulgar language or off-topic classroom discussion.
Although these are both legitimate concerns, I ultimately reject
them.
As to the first concern, it is true that while the Tinker standard
is often referred to as the “substantial disruption” or “substantial
interference” standard (as, indeed, I have repeatedly referred to it
in this Article), it actually has two parts: it allows proscription of
speech that school officials reasonably anticipate will “substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the
rights of other students.”133 One could legitimately worry that doing
away with Tinker could have the unintended consequence of preventing schools from proscribing bullying or other forms of speech
that impinge on the rights of other students.134

133. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (emphasis
added).
134. See Harding, supra note 65, at 238–39; Martha McCarthy, The Fate of Student Off-
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However, this concern is without merit. There may have been a
time at which the impingement portion of the Tinker standard was
a necessary limit on the First Amendment rights of schoolchildren,
but at this point any need is, at best, vestigial. This is because
forms of speech which impinge upon the rights of others, such as
harassment, fighting words, true threats, and child pornography,
already fall outside the scope of the First Amendment’s speech protections.135 Schools do not need Tinker to proscribe such speech because they already have the authority to do so. There are real concerns about when and where schools may exercise this authority,
but those concerns sound primarily in the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments, not in the First Amendment.136
The second concern, that a standard that looks something like
the public forum analysis would prevent schools from implementing legitimate restrictions on student speech, warrants more indepth consideration. This is a valid concern, particularly because,
while governments are allowed to discriminate based on content in
some forums, they are not allowed to discriminate based on viewpoint in any type of forum.137 The trouble is that in a classroom,
where the goal is to transmit knowledge, school officials need leeway to limit student speech based on both content and viewpoint.138

Campus Expression: Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., 387 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 439,
451–52 (2021).
135. See Matthew Strauser & Noah C. Chauvin, Student-Athlete Employee Speech, 19
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 171, 176–77 nn.49–55, 178–79 (2020). Of note, Tinker was decided
about three and one-half months before the Supreme Court’s decision in Brandenburg v.
Ohio. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
136. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2052 (2021) (Alito,
J., concurring) (discussing the rights of parents in their childrens’ education and parents’
explicit or implicit delegation of some of that authority to schools); id. at 2059–62 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (discussing role of Fourteenth Amendment in schools’ regulation of student
speech).
137. E.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985);
Anderson v. Milwaukee Cnty., 433 F.3d 975, 979–80 (7th Cir. 2006); Ridley v. Mass. Bay
Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 82 (1st Cir. 2004).
138. See DRIVER, supra note 35, at 72 (“Of course, no serious person asserted that honoring the First Amendment in schools meant students could—unsolicited, and in the middle
of class—announce their views on presidential power, lead their classmates in a sing-along,
or recite a Walt Whitman verse.”); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 160
(“School authorities must be allowed to protect the primary educational function of teaching
in the classroom and the secondary functions of school administration which necessitate
maintenance of at least minimal order outside the classroom. Schools must also insure the
physical safety of their students.” (internal citation omitted)). Strict adherence to one of the
public forum categories could therefore “distract[] attention from the first amendment values at stake.” Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1224
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Consider an algebra class in which the teacher has asked the
students to solve for x in the equation 2x + 3 = 7. If a student raises
her hand and begins to expound on her theory that the teacher, the
school principal, and several members of the state’s congressional
delegation are lizard people bent on controlling humanity, the
teacher needs to be able to cut her off, and, if the student will not
stop or has exhibited a pattern of such behavior, dole out an appropriate punishment. This is a content-based restriction on the student’s speech, and it is plainly legitimate. The teacher must be allowed to restrict classroom discussion to algebra; otherwise, her
students would be able to filibuster their way out of having to learn
any math at all.139 Similarly, if a student raises his hand and says
that x = 4, or gives such an answer on a homework assignment,
quiz, test, or other such assessment, the teacher must be able to
tell him that he is wrong. This is a viewpoint-based restriction on
the student’s speech—x = 4 is a viewpoint, of sorts—but again, it is
plainly legitimate for a teacher to correct a student’s errors when
they are pedagogically relevant.140 Schools need the authority to
“punish” students for failure to demonstrate knowledge of the curriculum, even though governments generally may not restrict a
person’s speech based on the views he or she expresses.141
Similarly, schools have a legitimate interest in preventing or
punishing on-campus vulgarity.142 Yet, there is no way to enforce
such a prohibition without limiting certain viewpoints. “Fuck the
Draft” is, after all, a different message from “I Abhor the Draft.”143
But while “the States, acting as the guardians of public morality,
may [not] properly remove . . . offensive word[s] from the public

(1984).
139. A dream for many students, I am sure.
140. A less abstract example than incorrect solutions for x in an algebra class might involve student answers on an assessment regarding the evolution unit of a biology class. One
can easily imagine a student, when asked to explain the mechanism by which evolution
operates, writing something like “There is no such mechanism. All of God’s creatures are as
He made them.” This is a perfectly valid viewpoint, but the teacher still must be able to
mark it wrong.
141. Of note, however, is that schools cannot justify their decision to “punish” students
for incorrect answers on the belief/conduct distinction that allows governments to, for instance, punish hate crimes, see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993), because any
of the means that a student could reasonably be expected to use to express his belief that
x = 4 (or that evolution is belied by God’s intelligent design) are pure speech.
142. I do not mean for schools’ ability to limit vulgarity to be bounded by geography; they
also have, for instance, an interest in prohibiting vulgarity that occurs off campus during
school trips or outings.
143. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1971).
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vocabulary” of adults,144 they have much greater leeway when it
comes to the children whom they are charged with caring for and
educating.145 This leeway is at its zenith when schools are regulating vulgarity, obscenity, or the kind of vicious name-calling at
which children are so adept. So here, too, some degree of viewpoint
discrimination is called for.
I am hesitant to push these principles too far, however. My algebra example involved questions of objective fact,146 but what happens when students’ coursework calls on them to make subjective
evaluations? It is broadly recognized that schools have at least
some role to play in teaching their students certain values (including by removing offensive words from students’ public vocabulary),147 but can schools ever tell students that their religious, philosophical, or political beliefs are wrong?148 And, what to do with
factually inaccurate statements that occur outside of the classroom? If a student tells his friends at lunch that the moon landings
144. Id. at 22–24.
145. E.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986); Doninger ex.
rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48–49 (2d Cir. 2008); Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ. of
Mona Shores Pub. Schs., 380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 (W.D. Mich. 2005); see also Emily Gold
Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials and the Limits of
School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 653 (2011) (“Protecting the school
from disruption, of course, is not the only rationale in schools’ quivers when it comes to oncampus hostility about school officials. The educational rationale is also applicable here, at
least in the context of lewd, vulgar, or plainly offensive speech (as in Fraser) or school-sponsored speech (as in Hazelwood). It is on this basis that schools can legitimately prohibit vulgar speech that does not rise to the level of causing a substantial disruption.”).
146. Similarly, the biology example I gave, supra note 140, involved one of the most
widely accepted theories in science.
147. See, e.g., Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021)
(asserting that schools have “a strong interest in ensuring that future generations understand the workings in practice” that underpin our representative democracy). I disagree
with Justice Breyer on this point. Schools do not necessarily have an interest in instilling
democratic values in their students. Rather, society has an interest in schools instilling such
values. See Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 683 (“Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the
states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the ‘work of the schools.’” (internal citation
omitted)); Wright, supra note 35, at 5–6.
148. To me, the answer is obviously “no.” After all, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988)
(noting that students’ free speech rights are relatively high with regards to “personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises”). But a compelling argument can be
made that, for instance, the State’s “fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial
discrimination in education” means that school officials can enact a curriculum that requires
students to affirm that racial discrimination is bad—even if such an affirmation runs counter to a student’s deeply held religious beliefs. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983).
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were faked, can a teacher punish him for it? What if he denies the
Holocaust?
In areas in which there is legitimate debate, where what is at
issue is not objective fact but subjective interpretation of those
facts or values, schools should not be in the business of “prescrib[ing] what shall be orthodox.”149 Rather, decisions about such
issues should be left up to the students and their parents.150 Even
where issues outside of the scope of legitimate debate—as in the
example of the lunchroom Holocaust denier—schools should not be
in the business of punishing students for erroneous statements if
those statements are not made in the context of a curricular activity or to harass other members of the school community.151 Instead,
the school’s response should be, at most, to provide the erring student with correct information—hardly a radical notion in a school.
Still, even with these limitations, it is clear that schools need to
be able to effect both content- and viewpoint-based restrictions on
their students’ speech. Any student speech standard that denied
them this authority would undercut the schools’ abilities to do their
jobs effectively.152 This is why I do not propose using the public
forum doctrine to govern student speech without modification—
even treating schools as a nonpublic forum would require speech
regulations to be viewpoint-neutral, and if schools were viewed as
limited public forums, any speech regulations would have to be
content-neutral, as well.153
Instead, my proposed standard would limit the reach of schools’
authority to regulate student speech to forums the school creates
or controls, such as the school building itself, off-campus school

149. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
150. Indeed, one could question whether the State ought to or is allowed to be in the
business of inculcating values in students at all. But questions regarding the appropriate
balance of parents’ and students’ individual rights as against the sovereign power of the
majority are outside of the scope of this Article.
151. Some courts have found that “[s]chool officials have greater constitutional latitude
to suppress student speech than to punish it.” E.g., Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch.
Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard,
168 F. Supp. 2d 332, 334 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (“Unlike Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood, Plaintiff
was not completely silenced on the issue. She was never disciplined.”). Even accepting this
distinction as valid (and it is not obvious to me that we should), schools should also not be
in the business of restricting wrong or wrong-headed speech that is not made within the
context of curricular activities and does not interfere with the rights of other students.
152. On this point I agree with even those who are skeptical of students’ free speech
rights. See Roederer, supra note 35, at 258.
153. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811, 817
(1985); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
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trips, and school-issued technology. Within these bounds, schools
would be able to regulate student speech using a lower standard
than would generally apply to government speech restrictions.
This standard would allow, where appropriate, content- or viewpoint-based restrictions or prohibitions on speech.
“Where appropriate” is an important limitation here, however.
For instance, school officials should not be allowed to censor speech
based on viewpoint simply because they do not like a viewpoint—
only because it is wrong. Viewpoint-based restrictions, then,
should be limited to situations where objective facts are at issue in
the classroom (or on assessments), or to restricting vulgarity, obscenity, and other school-inappropriate speech. Outside of the
classroom, or where subjectivity is called for, school officials should
not be allowed to censor based on viewpoint. Likewise, contentbased regulations should generally be restricted to those contexts
where they serve a pedagogical purpose. In the classroom and in
certain other limited contexts, such as during sports games, educators should have the power to restrict the content of discussion
to the topic at hand. In all other contexts, school officials should
have very limited authority to regulate speech based on its content.
One can imagine some circumstances in which such regulations
will still be permitted—elementary school students will not be allowed to have sexually explicit discussions in the lunchroom—but
these exceptions will be few and far between.
Under my proposed replacement standard, then, school officials
will still be left with appropriate discretion to regulate student
speech. Indeed, my discussion of the standard in this Part might
lead some to raise the opposite concern: that using something like
the public forum analysis leads to the same issues as using the
Tinker standard. Specifically, one might worry that the standard
would give school officials too much discretion to determine which
speech they censor. When is a question one of objective fact, rather
than subjective? In what situations are content-based restrictions
on speech appropriate? My standard leaves these decisions to educators to make in the first instance.
It is true that the proposed standard is just a framework. As
such, it leaves to school officials and courts the task of filling in the
details. Too, it grants discretion to school officials to determine
when content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are appropriate. But it is a discretion significantly more constrained than
that granted to school authorities under Tinker. As discussed
above, it will substantially limit school officials’ authority to
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regulate speech based on its content or viewpoint—a limit not in
place under Tinker. It will also limit school officials’ ability to restrict speech based on listener reaction to it, an important innovation.
Of course, in a “perfect” world, we would be able to craft a single,
easy-to-apply standard that would perfectly constrain educators’
discretion and guarantee maximal protection for students’ speech
rights in every case. But such a world does not exist,154 and school
officials necessarily must have some discretion in determining for
themselves how best to balance students’ rights against the legitimate needs of the school.155 That being the case, we must content
ourselves with identifying and enacting standards governing student speech rights that reasonably constrain arbitrariness, protect
students’ speech rights, and bring student speech protections more
closely in line with the protections that apply to adults. The standard I have proposed as a replacement to Tinker achieves these
ends.
CONCLUSION
The Mahanoy opinion is undoubtedly a victory for student
speech rights. That it is a somewhat tepid victory is a result of the
Supreme Court’s understandable hesitance to “set forth a broad,
highly general First Amendment rule” with sweeping and difficultto-predict consequences.156 The Mahanoy factors give courts the
flexibility to decide cases with an eye toward their individual characteristics, unbound by bright-line rules that may lead to unfair
outcomes. However, by leaving in place Tinker’s effects-based test
for permissible censorship, the Court muddies the First Amendment waters by maintaining a standard that differs fundamentally
from the way restrictions on speech are typically analyzed. The
Court’s efforts to protect fairness—not to mention schoolchildren’s
free speech rights—would be better served by bringing the free

154. Thank goodness! It would be immeasurably boring, and then what would I have to
write about?
155. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 382, 392 n.4
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick
v. Hayward, 711 F.3d 426, 440 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as
a First Amendment Category: Bringing Order out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 728 (2009); Miles, supra note
97, at 389.
156. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (2021).
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speech doctrines that apply to public schools in line with those that
apply outside the schoolhouse gate.

